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".... when [Ricky Ray] Rector was given his last meal, 'he was so
simple he asked to save the pecan pie for later.""
"Eddie Mitchell, a retarded man on death row in Louisiana, waived
all his rights during his interrogation. But when an attorney asked
him if he had understood what 'waiving his rights' meant, Mitchell
raised his right hand and waved."2
I. INTRODUCTION
Mental retardation is not something you have, like blue eyes, or a
bad heart. Nor is it something you are, like short, or thin. It is not a
medical disorder, nor a mental disorder .... Mental retardation
reflects the 'fit' between the capabilities of individuals and the
structure and expectations of their environment.'
In light of this assertion, do mentally retarded persons have the same
capacity to understand the nature and consequences of their actions as
offenders of average intellect? Are mentally retarded persons deterred by
the fear of a death penalty sentence being imposed for their criminal actions?
Is there retribution in executing an individual who does not understand what
he has done or cannot control his impulses, even when he has an
understanding of right and wrong? These are questions that will be
discussed in this article in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Atkins v. Virginia.4
1. RAPHAEL GOLDMAN, CQ's VITAL ISSUES SERIES: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 60-61 (Ann Chih
Lin ed., 2002). Ricky Ray Rector was an Arkansas death row inmate with mental retardation who,
by all accounts, did not understand the nature of the punishment he was to receive the next day. id.
at 60.
2. ROSA EHRENREICH & JAMIE FELLNER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BEYOND REASON: THE
DEATH PENALTY AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION VI, available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/200 l/ustat/ (2001).
3. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL RETARDATION, DEFINITION OF MENTAL
RETARDATION, at http://www.aamr.org/Policies/faqmental-retardation.shtml (last visited Jan. 19,
2004).
4. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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A. Mental Retardation Defined
Mental retardation is defined by the American Association on Mental
Retardation (AAMR) 5 as "a disability characterized by significant
limitations both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as
expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills. This disability
originates before age 18. It is estimated that between 6.2 and 7.5 million
persons in the United States are mentally retarded.'
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV-Text Revision (DSM-IV)
defines mental retardation using the following three criteria: (A)
"significantly subaverage intellectual functioning," meaning an IQ of
approximately 70 or below on an individually administered IQ Test; (B)
concurrent deficits or impairments in present adaptive functioning (i.e. the
person's effectiveness in meeting the standards expected for his or her age
by his or her cultural group) in at least two of the following areas:
"communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of
community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work,
leisure, health, and safety"; and (C) onset before 18 years of age.8 The
DSM-IV further breaks down mental retardation into degrees of severity as
follows: mild mental retardation-IQ level 50-55 to approximately 70;
moderate retardation-IQ level 35-40 to 50-55; severe mental retardation-
IQ level 20-25 to 35-40; profound mental retardation-IQ level below 20 or
25.9
In recent years, the threshold IQ standard for mental retardation has
been lowered due to the social stigma associated with labeling a person as
mentally retarded.' °  Consequently, fewer persons with borderline
intellectual functioning, persons with IQs between 75 and 80, are being
given special education and other social assistance benefits." Currently, an
estimated 89% of all mentally retarded persons have IQs that fall in the 51 to
70 range for a diagnosis of mild mental retardation.' 2 Daryl Renard Atkins,
the defendant in Atkins v. Virginia, falls within this IQ range with an IQ
5. This appears to be the definition adopted by the Supreme Court. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 309 n.3 (2002); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 308 n.1 (1989).
6. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 3.
7. LEIGH ANN DAVIS, PEOPLE WITH MENTAL RETARDATION IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM, at http://www.thearc.org (2000). It is estimated that between 2% and 10% of prisoners
have mental retardation. Id.
8. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 41-42 (Michael B. First ed., 4th ed., text revision 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
9. Id. at 42-43.
10. See EHRENREICH & FELLNER. supra note 2, at II. In 1959, the American Association on
Mental Deficiency (later renamed the American Association on Mental Retardation [AAMR]) set 85
as the threshold IQ at which a person is considered mentally retarded. Id. The AAMR reduced the
IQ standard to 70 to 75 in 1992. Id.
11. Id. at 11 n.16.
12. See id. at II.
assessment of 59.13 Since Atkins met the criteria set forth defining mental
retardation, the Supreme Court was forced to confront whether capital
punishment was an appropriate sentence for mentally retarded inmates in
light of the Constitution of the United States and the "evolving standards of
decency" which "mark the progress of a maturing society" that are used in
determining if punishments are cruel and excessive.
14
B. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States
provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."'5  The Supreme
Court has "not confined the prohibition embodied in the Eighth Amendment
to 'barbarous' methods that were generally outlawed in the 18th century,"
but instead interprets the amendment in a "dynamic and flexible" way.16 In
assessing evolving standards of decency, the Court looks not to the
individual Justices' standards of decency, but rather to those of modem
American society as evidenced through legislation, because of the deference
given to state legislatures under the American federal system. 7
Nevertheless, while legislation may indicate a change on a particular issue in
the social climate, a movement against a particular type of punishment will
not suffice to prove an evolving standard of decency unless it, combined
with similar legislation in other jurisdictions, establishes a national
consensus that a punishment should be prohibited as cruel and unusual.' 8
The Court tackled the cruel and unusual punishment issue in Atkins by
examining recent legislation, public opinion polls, and de facto actions taken
by state officials with respect to executing mentally retarded individuals, in
order to determine whether society has evolved in such a way as to exclude
this particular group from capital punishment. 9 Consequently, based upon
its examination of the legislative movement, the Court concluded that
executing mentally retarded persons is cruel and unusual punishment.2 °
However, no standard was set forth for implementing this new constitutional
mandate, and the Court did not discuss its retroactive application.2'
13. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308-09 (2002). The doctor "administered the Wechsler
Adult Intelligence Scales test [WAIS-III], the standard instrument in the United States for assessing
intellectual functioning." Id. at 309 n.5.
14. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality opinion) (holding that losing
citizenship rights for deserting the armed services is cruel and unusual punishment).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. VIl (emphasis added).
16. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976).
17. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369-70 (1989) (plurality opinion).
18. Id. at 370-71 (plurality opinion) (holding that the fact that, of the thirty-seven states that
impose the death penalty, fifteen do not impose it on sixteen-year-old offenders and twelve do not
impose it on seventeen-year-old offenders was insufficient to establish a national consensus).
19. See generally Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 304 (2002).
20. Id. at 321.
21. See id. at318-21.
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Section II of this article will examine the history and background of
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and the developments that enabled the
Court to change its mind about the application of the death penalty to the
mentally retarded between its decision in Penry v. Lynaugh22 and Atkins.
Section III will set the framework for the Atkins case. Section IV will
analyze both the majority and dissenting opinions in the Atkins case.
Finally, Section V will discuss potential abuses, problems, solutions, and
ramifications of the Court's failure to set forth a standard for legislatures and
state officials to adopt.
1I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE LAW
A. No National Consensus in Late 1980s
The first statute prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded persons
was enacted in 1986 in response to the execution of Jerome Bowden, a man
identified as having mental retardation and an IQ of 65, after an initial stay
of execution was granted but then terminated the next day.23 The Georgia
Board of Pardons and Paroles determined that "Bowden understood the
nature of his crime and his punishment and therefore that execution, despite
his mental deficiencies, was permissible. 24 The Georgia state legislature
disagreed and enacted legislation specifically prohibiting capital punishment
of mentally retarded persons.25 Maryland quickly followed suit and passed a
similar prohibition.
2 6
Nevertheless, in the 1989 case of Penry v. Lynaugh, the Supreme Court
refused to categorically hold that the execution of mentally retarded
individuals was cruel and unusual punishment because there was not yet an
established "national consensus" against this type of punishment.2 7 At the
22. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
23. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-14 n.8.
24. Id. at 314 n.8.
25. Id. at 313-14; see GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(j) (1997) (stating that "should the ... jury or
court find in its verdict that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged but mentally retarded, the
death penalty shall not be imposed and the court shall sentence the defendant to imprisonment for
life"). The constitutionality of this statute was upheld in Fleming v. Zant, 386 S.E.2d 339 (1989).
26. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314; see MD. ANN. CODE, art. 27, § 412(f)(1) (1996).
27. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334 (1989). Johnny Paul Penry was convicted of the brutal
rape, beating, and murder of Pamela Carpenter in her home. Id. at 307. Penry had just been released
from prison after serving time for another rape conviction. Id. Jerome Brown, a clinical
psychologist, testified at Penry's competency hearing that Penry was mentally retarded with an IQ
between 50 and 63. Id. In Penry, the Court recognized that cruel and unusual punishment is "not
limited ... to those practices condemned by the common law in 1789," but that determinations of
whether a punishment is cruel and unusual also include "'evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society."' Id. at 330-31 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)
(plurality opinion)).
time of the decision, only Georgia, Maryland, and the federal government
had enacted legislation prohibiting the execution of the mentally retarded.
8
The majority, through Justice O'Connor, contrasted this with the Court's
decision to prohibit the execution of the mentally insane as set forth in Ford
v. Wainwright,29 where "[n]o state permitted the execution of the insane, and
twenty-six [s]tates had statutes explicitly requiring suspension of the
execution of a capital defendant who became insane. 3 °
Penry relied heavily on public opinion surveys that demonstrated that
the public disfavored executing mentally retarded individuals. 3' The Court
discounted the statistics and stated, "[t]he clearest and most reliable
objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the
country's legislatures. 32  The combination of two states with specific
legislation prohibiting the execution of the mentally retarded and fourteen
states with legislation prohibiting the death penalty in general did not
provide evidence of a "national consensus" against the practice.33
In dicta, Justice O'Connor recognized that certain levels of mental
retardation, i.e. severe mental retardation, would warrant exculpating such
individuals from criminal culpability because they lack the requisite
understanding of the impact of their criminal actions.34 Furthermore, Justice
O'Connor conceded that mental retardation may lessen the culpability of the
capital offender.35 Therefore, for those mentally retarded persons held to be
competent to stand trial, as was Penry, some protection could be offered by
mandating that "the sentencing body .. . consider mental retardation as a
mitigating circumstance in making the individualized determination whether
death is the appropriate punishment in a particular case" and not by
categorically prohibiting the execution of the mentally retarded.36 Justice
28. Id. at 334; see Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 21 U.S.C. § 848(1) (2000) (permitting the death
penalty for persons involved in drug-related felonies who commit an intentional killing, but
forbidding the execution of mentally retarded individuals who commit this crime); GA. CODE. ANN.
§ 17-7-1310) (1997); MD. ANN. CODE, art. 27, § 412(f)(1) (1996). Congress retained the provision
against executing mentally retarded individuals in the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994. See 18
U.S.C. § 3596(c) (2000).
29. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
30. Penry, 492 U.S. at 334 (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408 n.2 (1986)).
31. Id. In its amicus brief, the AAMR predicted that the public sentiment of these polls would
eventually prey upon legislators and would thus become "an objective indicator of contemporary
values upon which [the Court] can rely." Id. at 335.
32. Id. at 331.
33. Id. at 334.
34. See id. at 337 (opinion of O'Connor, J.). The Penry Court's reasoning was fragmented, with
some Justices joining Justice O'Connor's opinion only as to some parts and others joining only as to
other parts. Justice O'Connor was not joined by any of the other Justices in this portion of the
opinion. Id.
35. Id. at 340.
36. Id. at 337-38 (emphasis added). Justice O'Connor used mitigation to reconcile the conflict
between the AAMR's argument that "all mentally retarded people, regardless of their degree of
retardation, have substantial cognitive and behavioral disabilities that reduce their level of
blameworthiness for a capital offense," and the statement that, nevertheless, the mentally retarded
can be "held responsible or punished for criminal acts they commit." Id. at 336. Justice O'Connor
offered protection to mentally retarded defendants by providing that the jury must not only hear
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O'Connor did leave open the possibility of revisiting the case once a
"national consensus" had been sufficiently evidenced through legislation.37
Justice O'Connor noted that the Court has also disallowed the death
penalty when
application of the death penalty to particular categories of crimes or
classes of offenders violates the Eighth Amendment because it
"makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of
punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and
needless imposition of pain and suffering" or because it is "grossly
out of proportion to the severity of the crime.31
In dissent, Justice Brennan argued that this statement required the Court to
consider "whether a punishment is disproportionate by comparing 'the
gravity of the offense,' understood to include not only the injury caused, but
also the defendant's moral culpability, with 'the harshness of the penalty."' 3 9
Furthermore, the punishment must further important "penal goals of
deterrence or retribution., 40  While recognizing Justice O'Connor's
reservation about stereotyping all mentally retarded persons as "'inevitably
lack[ing] the cognitive, volitional, and moral capacity to act with the degree
of culpability associated with the death penalty,-' 4 1 Justice Brennan noted
that there is "no danger of spurious generalization because [the
characteristics] are a part of the clinical definition of mental retardation., 42
Thus, despite the ability of some mentally retarded persons to "'maintain
themselves independently or semi-independently in the community,' ' '43 their
impairments in reasoning, controlling impulsivity, and moral development
limit their culpability, making death "always and necessarily
evidence of mitigating circumstances but must also have a mechanism for giving effect to those
mitigating circumstances. Id. at 319.
37. Id. at 340.
38. Id. at 335 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)).
39. Id. at 343 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983))
(emphasis added).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 343-44 (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 338 (Opinion of O'Connor, J.)).
42. Id. at 344 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The definition specifically includes "'significantly
subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive
behavior .... ' Id. (quoting AAMR, CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 11 (H. Grossman
ed., 1983)). While recognizing that variations exist in the degree of the intellectual deficit, from
mild mental retardation, with an IQ closer to 70, to profound mental retardation, with an IQ near 20,
Justice Brennan pointedly asserted that regardless of degree "all individuals [designated as mentally
retarded] share the common attributes of low intelligence and inadequacies in adaptive behavior."
Id. at 344-45 (quoting AAMR, CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION I I (H. Grossman ed..
1983)); see also AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 3.
43. Penry, 492 U.S. at 345-46 (quoting AAMR, CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 184
(H. Grossman ed., 1983)).
disproportionate to [the offenders'] blameworthiness and hence...
unconstitutional."44
Additionally, Justice Brennan argued that allowing judges and juries to
hear and give effect to evidence regarding the offenders' mental retardation
is insufficient to ensure proper individualized determinations of
proportionality of punishment. 45  He feared that evidence of mental
retardation would be outweighed by other factors in determining
culpability.46
Finally, Justice Brennan argued that executing mentally retarded persons
fails to further the penal goals of deterrence and retribution. 47 According to
Justice Brennan, the "'heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal
sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal
offender' ' '48 and, because mentally retarded offenders lack the requisite
culpability, "execution can never be the 'just desserts' of a retarded
offender."'49  Moreover, deterrence cannot be achieved when the person is
unable to anticipate the consequences of his or her criminality and unable to
control his or her impulses. 50 Thus, capital punishment of mentally retarded
individuals is "'nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition
of pain and suffering.' 51  Nevertheless, it was still an accepted practice in
the wake of Penry.
B. International Consensus
There is a worldwide movement towards prohibiting capital punishment
in all circumstances. 2 One hundred and eleven out of the world's nearly
200 countries have abolished capital punishment entirely.53 Of the countries
44. Id. at 346. But cf Cathleen C. Herasimchuk, Keep Inmates' IQs Out of Death Penalty
Decisions, HOUSTON CHRON., May 21, 1999, reprinted in THE DEATH PENALTY: OPPOSING
VIEWPOINTS 188 (Mary E. Williams ed., 2002) (asserting that "[r]esponsibility in the criminal
justice system is based on moral blameworthiness, not intellectual achievements"). Ms.
Herasimchuk believes that moral blameworthiness is measured by the individual's entire state of
mind, which includes "his factual knowledge, intellectual understanding, intent, [and] his spiritual
and moral development." Id. at 189. This argument is circular, however, because a mentally
retarded individual is likely to have less factual knowledge, certainly less intellectual understanding,
perhaps lack of the requisite intent, and, most likely, deficiencies in both his spiritual and moral
development, all of which relate back to the mentally retarded inmate's intellectual impairment.
45. Penry, 492 U.S. at 347 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
46. Id. The problem is that the death penalty is reserved for only the most heinous of crimes and
therefore the judge or jury considers the mental retardation of the perpetrator in light of the
heinousness of the offense, which has an emotionally powerful effect. See id. at 347. This makes it
far more difficult, as a practical matter, to give effect to mental retardation as a mitigating factor.
See id. For a description of John Paul Penry's offense, see infra note 172.
47. Penry, 492 U.S. at 348.
48. Id. (quoting Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987)).
49. Id. (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 456 U.S. 762, 801 (1982)).
50. Id. at 349.
51. Id. (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1972)).
52. EHRENREICH & FELLNER, supra note 2, at III.
53. See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did= I 27&scid=30 (2004).
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that still employ capital punishment, only the United States, Japan, and
Kyrgyzstan executed mentally retarded offenders when Atkins was
decided.54 Furthermore, the United States has continually been criticized by
human rights activists for falling behind "the standard of decency of almost
every other country in the world... when it comes to the death penalty."55
Before the Atkins decision was handed down, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights issued a resolution on April 25, 2002
urging "all States that still maintain the death penalty ... [n]ot to impose the
death penalty on a person suffering from any form of a mental disorder. 56
The United Nations Special Rapporteur was particularly concerned that,
due to the nature of mental retardation, "'mentally retarded persons are
much more vulnerable to manipulation during arrest, interrogation, and
confession. Moreover, mental retardation appears not to be compatible with
the principle of full criminal responsibility."' 57
C. A Potential National Consensus?
While there was not yet a national consensus on the propriety of
executing mentally retarded persons at the time of the Penry decision,
Justice O'Connor indicated that the issue might be revisited upon a later
showing of a national consensus. 58 In response to the 1989 Penry decision, a
number of organizations supported the movement towards complete
prohibition of capital punishment when the offender is mentally retarded. 9
For example, the American Bar Association created a policy disfavoring
capital punishment of mentally retarded persons, asserting, "execution of
such individuals is unacceptable in a civilized society, irrespective of their
guilt or innocence. 6 °
Despite the Court's attempt to force the lower courts to use mental
retardation as a mitigating circumstance in capital punishment cases, thirty-
54. See EHRENREICH & FELLNER, supra note 2, at III (citing U.N. Commission on Human
Rights, Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Report by the Special Rapporteur,
E/CN.4/1995/61, para. 380 (1994)).
55. Jamie Fellner, Mentally Retarded Don't Belong on Death Row, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 4, 2000, at
A 19, available at http://www.hrw.org/editorials/2000/death-0 105-cron.htm.
56. The Question of the Death Penalty, Res. 2002/77, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 56th mtg., U.N.
Doc. E/2002/23, available at http://eurunion.org/legislat/DeathPenalty[UNCHRRes20277.htm
(2002).
57. EHRENREICH & FELLNER, supra note 2, at III (quoting U.N. Commission on Human Rights,
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Report by the Special Rapporteur,
E/CN.4/1998/68/Add.3, para. 58 (1998)).
58. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989).
59. Press Release, Death Penalty Information Center, Supreme Court Declares Execution of
Persons with Mental Retardation Unconstitutional: Ruling Reflects Growing National Consensus on
Issue, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/PR-DPICAtkins.pdf (June 20, 2002).
60. Id.
five mentally retarded offenders had been executed since 1976.61 Six of
those offenders were executed in 1995 alone.62 Thus, using mental
retardation as a mitigating factor was unlikely to stop the practice of
executing mentally retarded persons.63 Apparently recognizing this fact,
sixteen state legislatures (Kentucky, Tennessee, New Mexico, Arkansas,
Colorado, Washington, Indiana, Kansas, New York, Nebraska, South
Dakota, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Missouri, and North Carolina) passed
laws similar to those of Maryland and Georgia, prohibiting the execution of
mentally retarded individuals. 64
The responses of these sixteen legislatures, coupled with Maryland,
Georgia, and the federal government's prohibitions, led the Supreme Court
to agree to review the case of Earnest McCarver, a North Carolina death row
inmate, in March 2001.65 However, North Carolina enacted legislation
prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded offenders after certiorari was
granted, rendering McCarver's plight moot.66 Thus, in September 2001, the
Court agreed to hear the case of a Virginia death row inmate with mental
retardation, Daryl Atkins.67
III. FACTS OF THE CASE
Daryl Renard Atkins was convicted of the armed robbery, abduction,
and murder of Eric Nesbitt and was sentenced to death in the state of
61. Mary H. Cooper, Issues, Viewpoints, and Trends, in THE CQ RESEARCHER 3-23 (1999),
reprinted in CQ's VITAL ISSUES SERIES: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 4 (Ann Chih Lin ed., 2002).
62. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL RETARDATION, FACT SHEET: THE DEATH PENALTY, at
http://www.aamr.org/Policies/faq-death-penalty.shtml (last modified Mar. 6, 2001). Moreover, in
the criminal justice system mental retardation is present between 4% andl0% of the time, while in
the general population the prevalence of mental retardation is between 1.5% and 2.5%. Id.
63. See id.
64. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02 (West 2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (Michie
2002); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-9-401 (West 2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-46a (2002);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137 (West 2002); IND. CODE §§ 35-36-9-2 to 35-36-9-6 (2002); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-4623 (2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 532.130, 532.135, 532.140 (Banks-Baldwin
2002); Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (2002); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
31-20A-2.1 (Michie 2002); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney 2002) (excludes
prohibition if the killing was done while incarcerated as stated in N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
400.27.12(d)); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-26.1 (Michie 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-
203 (2002); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030 (2002).
65. See MEI LING REIN, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CRUEL AND UNUSUAL? 42 (2002).
66. McCarver v. North Carolina, 121 S. Ct. 1401 (2001) (mem.), cert. dismissed, 533 U.S. 975
(2001). Interestingly, McCarver's grant of certiorari was dismissed because North Carolina enacted
legislation prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded persons with an IQ of 70 or below. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005(a)-(b) (2002). Unfortunately for McCarver, his initial IQ test result
was 74, but when measured again his IQ was 67, resulting in an average IQ score of 70.5, one-half
point higher than required to be excluded from capital punishment under North Carolina's statute.
Stan Swofford, Lawsuit Challenges Execution: Defining Retardation by IQs Questioned,
GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., Sept. 14, 2002, at B 1. Currently, the statute is under attack on behalf
of McCarver; these new proposals seek to include mentally retarded individuals with IQs between 71
and 75 in the prohibition. Id.
67. See REIN, supra note 65, at 42; see also Atkins v. Virginia, 533 U.S. 976 (2001) (granting
cert.).
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Virginia.68 He committed these crimes with a cohort, William Jones, who
pled guilty to murder in exchange for his testimony against Atkins. 69 Both
men testified at trial, although Jones's testimony was more coherent and
credible, that the other had been responsible for actually shooting Eric
Nesbitt eight times after they had abducted him and forced him to withdraw
cash from an automated teller machine.7 ° Jones's testimony sufficiently
proved Atkins's guilt, and he was convicted of capital murder.7'
In the sentencing phase of the trial, the defense introduced Dr. Evan
Nelson, who had determined that Atkins was mildly mentally retarded.72
His determination was "based on interviews with people who knew Atkins, a
review of school and court records, and the administration of a standard
intelligence test which indicated that Atkins had a full scale IQ of 59.,73
Nevertheless, Mr. Atkins was ultimately sentenced to death after the
Virginia Supreme Court first reversed and remanded the initial death
sentence for a second sentencing hearing because the first sentencing
hearing had used a "misleading verdict form. 74 At the second sentencing
hearing, the State used Dr. Stanton Samenow to rebut Dr. Nelson's
testimony.75 Importantly, Dr. Samenow never administered an intelligence
test, but instead asked Atkins questions from the Wechsler Memory Scale.76
This was not the test that Dr. Nelson had utilized.77 Instead of diagnosing
Atkins with mental retardation, Dr. Samenow diagnosed Atkins with
antisocial personality disorder.78 Dr. Samenow urged that Atkins was of
"average intelligence, 79 and attributed his terrible academic performance to
Atkins being "a person who [chooses] to pay attention sometimes, not to pay
attention others, and [who] did poorly because he did not want to do what he
was required to do." 80 Atkins was again sentenced to death. 81
This time, the Virginia Supreme Court upheld the capital punishment
verdict, dismissing Atkins's argument that as a mentally retarded person he
68. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307 (2002).
69. Id. at 307 n.j. This made Jones ineligible for the death penalty. Id.
70. Id. at 307.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 308.
73. Id. at 308-09; see also id. at 309 n.4. Atkins was given the Wechsler Adult Intelligence
Scales test (WAIS-III), which is the standard test given to evaluate intellectual functioning in the
United States. Id. at 309 n.5. Mild mental retardation is defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual as an IQ level between 50 to 55 and 70. See DSM-IV, supra note 8.
74. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309; see Atkins v. Virginia, 510 S.E.2d 445 (1999).
75. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309.
76. Id. at 309 n.6.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 309.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 309 n.6.
81. Id. at 309.
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could not be sentenced to death.82 Moreover, the Virginia court blatantly
refused "to commute Atkins' sentence of death to life imprisonment merely
because of his IQ score. '83 Virginia Supreme Court Justices Hassell and
Koontz dissented, stating that it was
indefensible to conclude that individuals who are mentally retarded
are not to some degree less culpable for their criminal acts. By
definition, such individuals have substantial limitations not shared
by the general population. A moral and civilized society diminishes
itself if its system of justice does not afford recognition and
consideration of those limitations in a meaningful way.
8 4
The gravity of the dissenters' concerns coupled with the number of
legislatures that had implemented legislation prohibiting the execution of
mentally retarded individuals led the United States Supreme Court to review
Atkins v. Virginia.5
IV. ANALYSIS OF ATKINS V. VIRGINIA
A. The Eighth Amendment Draws Its Interpretation from Current Societal
Standards of Decency.
The Court, in a 6-3 decision, began by emphasizing the mandates of the
Constitution's Eighth Amendment.8 6  "The basic concept underlying the
Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man .... The
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society. '"87 The majority, through
Justice Stevens, explained that claims of excessive punishment must be
judged by the standards that currently prevail rather than the standards
adopted by the framers of the Bill of Rights.88 In reviewing society's current
standard of decency in regard to a particular issue, the "clearest and most
reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted
by the country's legislatures."'8 9
82. Id. at 310; see Atkins v. Virginia, 534 S.E.2d 312, 318 (2000) (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302, 336 (1989), as authority for the proposition).
83. Atkins, 536 U.S at 310 (quoting Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at 321).
84. Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at 325 (Hassell, J., dissenting).
85. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 310; see Atkins v. Virginia, 533 U.S. 976 (2001) (mem.) (granting cert.).
86. Atkins, 536 U.S at 311. Justice Stevens wrote for the majority, joined by Justice Breyer,
Justice Ginsburg, Justice Kennedy, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Souter. Id. at 306.
87. Id. at 311-12 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
88. Id. at 311.
89. Id. (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)). The Court continued by noting
several instances where the Court had previously relied on such evidence to reject certain
punishments for certain crimes. Id; see, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-96, 97 (1977)
(holding that capital punishment was excessive punishment for rape of an adult woman in light of
the fact that a majority of state legislatures have rejected death as a permissible penalty for that
crime); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789-93 (1982) (holding that capital punishment was
886
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However, the Court noted that the Constitution still mandates that "in
the end [the Justices] own judgment will be brought to bear on the question
of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment." 90
For example, the Court in Enmund v. Florida agreed with legislative action
that prohibited capital punishment when the offender did not have intent to
commit the crime and did not actually commit the crime because in that case
capital punishment did not "measurably contribute to the retributive end of
ensuring that the criminal gets his just deserts."9' When a consensus is
involved in determining whether there is a national standard, the Justices'
"judgment is 'brought to bear' by asking whether there is a reason to
disagree with the judgment reached by the citizenry and its legislators." 92
Thus, the Court will accept evolving standards so long as there is no reason
to disagree with the movement by the people and legislatures.
93
Of particular importance to the majority was not only the sheer number
of states that had enacted legislation prohibiting the execution of mentally
retarded persons, but also "the consistency of the direction of change,"
94
especially
[g]iven the well known fact that anticrime legislation is far more
popular than legislation providing protections for persons guilty of
violent crime, the large number of [s]tates prohibiting the execution
of mentally retarded persons (and the complete absence of [s]tates
passing legislation reinstating the power to conduct such
executions) provides powerful evidence that today our society
views mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable
than the average criminal. 95
improper where the offender did not take life, intend to take life, or even attempt to take life, and
citing the legislation of the majority of states as in accord). But what if several states adopted
legislation only permitting the execution of female defendants? Would this necessarily indicate a
societal movement in favor of killing women? While this may be a stretch, it would be imprudent to
assume that all actions by state legislatures have good intentions behind them and are not bolstered
by the legislators' own political aspirations. Relying on the actions of state legislatures as "objective
evidence" of contemporary values could prove dangerous should a strong, wealthy lobby appear.
90. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 597).
91. Id. at 315 (quoting Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801).
92. Id. at 315-16 (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 597).
93. See id. However, there is a limitation on the national consensus approach to cruel and
unusual punishments. Namely, the Court is expected to reject any consensus that is not in accord
with the Constitution, specifically the guarantees of equal protection and due process. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV. Therefore, in response to the question posed earlier, should the legislatures
uniformly adopt a rule only allowing capital punishment for female offenders, the Court would
likely (and hopefully) disagree with the movement and refuse to implement the consensus as
proffered. See id.
94. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315.
95. Id. at 315-16.
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Furthermore, the Court noted that even in states where there is not express
legislation prohibiting such executions, none have occurred in years.96
Similarly, a number of organizations, including religious communities, share
the belief that it is morally wrong to execute a mentally retarded offender. 97
National opinion polls also reflect a consensus among the citizenry, even
among those in favor of capital punishment in other situations, that the
practice should be forbidden.98 Furthermore, most serious disagreements
plaguing the issue of executing mentally retarded persons come in the form
of determining who is actually retarded99 because not all offenders claiming
to be mentally retarded will fall within the standards that provide a national
consensus.'0° Thus, the Court concluded that the evidence showed that a
"national consensus" had been reached on the issue.' 0'
B. The Penalogical Goals of Capital Punishment
In order to bear upon the judgment of the "national consensus," the
Court next turned to the penalogical goals of capital punishment.
Although mentally retarded persons often "know the difference between
right and wrong and are competent to stand trial,"' 2 these individuals, by
definition, have "diminished capacities to understand and process
information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from
experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to
understand the reactions of others."'0 3  Because of these limitations, the
Court held that mentally retarded offenders should be entirely excluded from
capital punishment, as they have been in eighteen jurisdictions, for the
following two reasons.1 °4
96. Id. at 316 (referring to states such as New Hampshire and New Jersey).
97. Id. at 316 n.21. Among the groups that oppose the execution of mentally retarded persons
are the American Psychological Association (APA), the AAMR, Christian, Jewish, Muslim, and
Buddhist representatives, and the European Union. Id.
98. Id. (stating that "[a]lthough these factors are by no means dispositive, their consistency with
the legislation evidence lends further support to our conclusion that there is a consensus among those
who have addressed the issue"). But see id. at 328 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (Appendix to
Opinion) (asserting that the opinion polls, the positions of several organizations, and international
opinion are unreliable evidence of a national consensus).
99. Id. at 317. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court opted to "'leave to the [s]tates the task of
developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon its execution of
sentences."' Id. (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405, 416-17 (1986)).
100. Id. However, the Court did assert that the definitions should be similar to those posed by
either the AAMR or the APA. Id. at 317 n.22.
101. Seeid. at313-17.
102. Id. at 318. If the offender is so profoundly retarded as to be classified as "mentally
incompetent he or she will not be required to stand trial .... However, findings of mental
incompetence are extremely rare." EHRENREICH & FELLNER, supra note 2, at IV. Moreover, upon a
determination of competency to stand trial, these individuals are "deemed capable of understanding
the nature and purpose of the legal proceedings and of cooperating, communicat[ing] and working
with defense counsel." Id.
103. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318. However, this does not entirely excuse them from punishment. Id.
104. Id. at 318-19.
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1. Capital Punishment Should Serve the Important Goals of Deterrence
and Retribution.
In Gregg v. Georgia, the Court identified the social purposes of capital
punishment as "retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective
offenders."' 15  However, because of the cognitive limitations of mentally
retarded offenders, there is serious doubt as to whether either one of these
purposes is furthered by executing them. 0 6 Moreover, without achieving
one of these two goals, capital punishment is nothing more than the
"'needless imposition of pain and suffering"' and is unconstitutional.' °7
Retribution is designed to insure that the offender receives what he or
she deserves for the harm caused to the victim and the victim's family. 10 8
Thus, "the severity of the appropriate punishment necessarily depends on the
culpability of the offender."' 0 9  Since Gregg v. Georgia, the Court has
narrowed the types of individuals and crimes that can be subject to this
ultimate punishment."0 The Atkins Court logically inferred then that "[i]f
the culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to justify the most
extreme sanction available to the [s]tate, the lesser culpability of the
mentally retarded offender ... does not merit that form of retribution."''
Consequently, excluding mentally retarded persons from capital punishment
was appropriate considering the narrowing jurisprudence in this area of
law.' 12
The goal of deterrence is served by preventing the criminal activity of
prospective offenders."13  Therefore, the death penalty "'can serve as a
deterrent only when [the] murder is the result of premeditation and
deliberation.""' 4 The theory behind this notion is that the more final and
severe a punishment, the more likely the prospect of the punishment will
105. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
106. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319-20.
107. Id. at 319 (quoting Enmund v. Florida. 458 U.S. 782. 798 (1982)).
108. Id.
109. Id. However, a prerequisite for capital punishment is "high moral blameworthiness,"
something mentally retarded individuals, by definition, are unable to satisfy. EHRENREICH &
FELLNER, supra note 2, at VII.
110. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319-20; see, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980)
(requiring a "consciousness more 'depraved' than that of any person guilty of murder" for capital
punishment to be imposed).
11. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.
112. Id. Justice Stevens cited only the Godfrey case as evidence of narrowing death penalty
jurisprudence. However, Godfrey hardly suggests a significant reduction in the number of people
who can be sentenced to death, considering that 3,701 inmates currently sit on death row throughout
the United States. See Jamie Fellner, U.S.: Supreme Court Ban Ends "Barbaric" Executions, HUM.
RTS. NEWS, June 20, 2002, at http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/06/deathpen.htm.
113. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.
114. Id. (quoting Enmund, 458 U.S. at 799.)
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prevent the potential offender from carrying out the criminal conduct.'
1 5
The Court explained that, because of the cognitive deficiencies of mentally
retarded individuals, severe punishments are not likely to inhibit their
criminality because they cannot appreciate the severe consequences of such
behavior and thus a measurable deterrent effect will not be achieved by
mandating execution. 16 Furthermore, prohibiting execution of the mentally
retarded will not reduce the deterrent effect on non-mentally retarded
offenders because they will remain unprotected by the prohibition and
continue to face the death penalty in the wake of heinous crimes.
1 7
2. The Procedural Safeguards in the Criminal Justice System Are
Insufficient to Protect Mentally Retarded Persons.
Finally, the Atkins Court recognized that mentally retarded offenders do
not benefit from the procedural safeguards afforded by both case law and the
Constitution! There are numerous hurdles that mentally retarded
individuals encounter when entering the criminal justice system." 9 Most
importantly, "[t]he risk 'that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of
factors which may call for a less severe penalty' . . . is enhanced ... by the
possibility of false confessions...,,120 and "the lesser ability of mentally
retarded defendants to make a persuasive showing of mitigation in the face
of prosecutorial evidence of one or more aggravating factors." 121 Mentally
retarded defendants "may be less able to give meaningful assistance to their
counsel,"' 122 are ineffective witnesses, and "their demeanor may create an
115. Id. at 320.
116. Id. There is evidence that mentally retarded individuals are unable to understand abstract
concepts such as death or murder. EHRENREICH & FELLNER, supra note 2, at II. For example,
Morris Mason, who was convicted of rape and murder and subsequently executed in Virginia in
1985 was reported to have "asked one of his legal advisors for advice on what to wear to his
funeral." Id. (citing ROBERT PERSKE, UNEQUAL JUSTICE? WHAT CAN HAPPEN WHEN PERSONS
WITH RETARDATION OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES ENCOUNTER THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 100-01 (Abingdon Press 1991)).
117. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320.
118. Id. at 320-21.
119. See id.
120. Id. at 320 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)). A false confession nearly
killed Earl Washington in Virginia until DNA evidence exonerated him just days before his
execution. Tim McGlone et al., A Near Fatal Injustice, VIRGINIA-PILOT, Jan. 22, 2001, at A1. Even
after the tests exonerated him, he was kept in prison and not fully pardoned for an additional five-
and-a-half years. Id. A former employer of Mr. Washington noted that "[y]ou could get [him] to
confess that he walked on the moon." Id. This is exactly what the police did. See id. Upon
questioning, the police asked a series of questions regarding the physical attributes of the female
victim. See id. Mr. Washington answered every question incorrectly; however, by the time he
signed the statement, "he had the facts straight." Id. Ehrenreich & Fellner attribute false confessions
of mentally retarded individuals to a desperate attempt for "approval and friendship." EHRENREICH
& FELLNER, supra note 2, at II. They theorize that, as a result of "abuse, taunts, and rejection
because of their low intelligence[,] ... [mentally retarded individuals are] [e]ager to be accepted and
eager to please ... [rendering them] highly suggestible." Id.
121. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320.
122. Id. at 320-21. Furthermore, coupled with inexperienced, overworked, or uninterested defense
counsel, this can pose a serious threat to the offender's ability to effectively mitigate the
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unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their crimes."' 23 The Court
found that relying on mental retardation as a mitigating factor was not only
ineffective in protecting mentally retarded offenders but might also "enhance
the likelihood .... of future dangerousness [being] found by the jury."'124
Ultimately, the Court concluded, in a 6-3 decision, 25 that they agreed
with the movement of the eighteen legislatures, the organizations and
religious groups, and the opinion polls that the death penalty "is not a
suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal."'126
C. Was Too Much Weight Given to the "National Consensus" Theory when
the Evidence Did Not Support Such a Conclusion?
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, focused
his dissent on the inadequacy of the sources used by the majority to bolster
the "national consensus" reasoning.1 7 He argued that while eighteen states
have recently passed legislation prohibiting the execution of mentally
retarded offenders, twenty states, including Virginia, "continue to leave the
question of proper punishment to the individuated consideration of
sentencing judges or juries familiar with the particular offender and his or
her crime."'' 28  Chief Justice Rehnquist dismissed the notion that other
sources, including opinion polls, the views of professional and religious
organizations, and international public policy were at all relevant in
determining the constitutionality of this type of punishment.12 9 Furthermore,
the inclusion of this type of evidence, according to the Chief Justice, was
"antithetical to considerations of federalism, which instruct that any
'permanent prohibition upon all units of democratic government must [be
circumstances of his crime by introducing evidence of mental retardation. EHRENREiCH & FELLNER,
supra note 2, at IV. This is another possible reason that thirty-five mentally retarded offenders have
been executed since the reinstatement of the death penalty in 1976, despite the mitigation protection
assured in Penrv. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 337-38 (1989).
123. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 32 1. Ehrenreich & Fellner note that
[flow intelligence and limited adaptive skills also mean that people with mental
retardation often miss social "cues" that other adults understand .... They may act in
ways that seem suspicious, even when they have done nothing wrong. When questioned
by police ... they often smile inappropriately, fail to remain still when ordered to do so,
or act agitated and furtive when they should be calm and polite. Others may fall asleep at
the wrong moment.
EHRENREICH & FELLNER, supra note 2, at II.
124. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
125. Justice O'Connor joined the opinion of the majority in Atkins, although she had written the
opinion in Penrv that refused to categorically prohibit the execution of mentally retarded persons.
See Penry. 492 U.S. at 340. Apparently she found the movement by the state legislatures to be
indicative of a "national consensus." See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
126. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
127. Id. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
128. Id.
129. Id.
apparent] in the operative acts (laws and the application of laws) that the
people have approved."" 30  In other words, to determine if a change has
occurred in American notions of the standard of decency, Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence demands that legislation alone bolster this
evolution, not opinion polls and the like.' 13  Consequently, because
legislation is the most objective evidence of a national consensus, followed
perhaps by the decisions of juries (although these should be given
considerably less weight than legislation), these should be the only two
indicators of a national consensus. 32 This notion is based on the idea that
legislatures and juries are "better suited than courts to evaluating and giving
effect to the complex societal and moral considerations that inform the
selection of publicly acceptable criminal punishments."'
133
Furthermore, Chief Justice Rehnquist not only dismissed the majority's
use of opinion polls but also discounted the accuracy of the opinion polls.
134
The Chief Justice opined that the opinion polls referenced in the majority
opinion were not sufficiently proven to have been "conducted in accordance
with generally accepted scientific principles or [to be] capable of supporting
valid empirical inferences about the issue .... Chief Justice Rehnquist
noted the ease with which results from polls can be skewed by sampling
different populations, varying survey methodologies, and varying the
questions asked of the sample. 36 Moreover, the opinion polls cited by the
Atkins majority did not disclose the targeted sample populations or the
techniques used by the researchers. 137 Thus, for the Chief Justice, the use of
any poll data was error.
138
While the Chief Justice conceded that the international climate on a
cruel and unusual punishment issue could reinforce conclusions regarding an
evolving standard of decency, it cannot alone evidence the movement of
opinion on domestic soil. 139 Precedent has "explicitly rejected the idea that
130. Id. (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 377 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
131. Id. at 322-23.
132. Id. at 323. Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that evidence of the actions of sentencing juries
could also have "significant and reliable" weight, although less than that of legislative actions. Id;
see Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596-97 (1977) (noting that nine out of ten juries in Georgia did
not impose the death penalty for rape convictions); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 793-94 (1982)
(giving great weight to evidence that sentencing juries did not impose the death penalty when a
person did not attempt to, intend to, or actually take a life, despite the lack of legislative action in the
same direction).
133. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 324. Atkins did not include statistical evidence regarding whether juries
believe that executing mentally retarded defendants is disproportionate to their moral
blameworthiness. Id.
134. Id. at 322.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 326.
137. Id. at 327.
138. ld. at 328.
139. Id. at 324-25; see also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 n.l (1982). The Stanford
Court stated, "[w]e emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive,
rejecting the contention . . . that the sentencing practices of other countries are relevant." Stanford,
492 U.S. at 370. Although these arguments are relevant, how much weight did the majority really
give to the fact that international consensus is against capital punishment in this context? The Court
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the sentencing practices of other countries [can] 'serve to establish.., that
[a] practice is accepted among our people.""140 Accordingly, evidence of a
national consensus has to be from actions taken by Americans and not by
the actions of foreign legislatures and populace.1
4
'
Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the amicus briefs of
organizations, both professional and religious, that supported Atkins's
contention that there is a national consensus against executing mentally
retarded persons. 142 The Chief Justice asserted that this type of evidence
should be afforded no weight, particularly where the "elected representatives
of a [s]tate's populace have not deemed them persuasive enough to prompt
legislative action."'
143
Ultimately, the Chief Justice found that the evidence introduced by
Atkins in support of a national consensus was insufficient to prove its
existence.'"4 He feared that the Justices' subjective views on the issues of
mental retardation and capital punishment weighed too heavily on the
majority's decision in this case, particularly in light of the Court's Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence and evolving standards of decency. 145
D. Do All Persons with Mental Retardation, No Matter How Slight, Lack
the Moral Culpability Required of a Death Penalty Offender?
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas,
began his dissent by reiterating the facts of the case, paying particular
attention to the testimony of Atkins's previous victims-he had been
convicted of sixteen various crimes before this case-especially with regard
to the violence they were subjected to by Atkins. 146 Moreover, Atkins's
"mental retardation was a central issue at sentencing." 147  Nevertheless,
"[t]he jury concluded.., that his alleged retardation was not a compelling
reason to exempt him from the death penalty in light of the brutality of his
crime and his long demonstrated propensity for violence. ' 48 Justice Scalia
referred to international opinion in only one footnote of the opinion. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316
n.21.
140. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 325 (quoting Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 326.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 328.
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., id. at 338-39. Atkins hit a victim with a beer bottle and slapped a gun across the
face of a victim before using it to shoot her in the stomach. Id. Justice Scalia's analysis of the facts
also gave deference to the testimony of Atkins's co-conspirator, William Jones, which bolstered the
notion that Atkins actually shot Nesbitt eight times. Id. at 338.
147. Id. at 339 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
148. Id. Justice Scalia appears to be insinuating that the jury did consider Atkins's mental
retardation as a mitigating factor, but it was not strong enough to forbid the death penalty under the
circumstances of this particular case. See id.
893
disagreed with the majority's decision to "'upset[] this particularized
judgment on the basis of a constitutional absolute' . . . conclud[ing] that no
one who is even slightly mentally retarded can have sufficient 'moral
responsibility to be subjected to capital punishment .... ,,149
Justice Scalia acknowledged that Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
regarding cruel and unusual punishment has developed around two
categories: either the punishment was considered cruel and unusual at the
time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights or it is a punishment method that is
inconsistent with "modern 'standards of decency,' as evinced by objective
indicia, the most important of which is 'legislation enacted by the country's
legislatures. -150
As to the first category, "[o]nly severely or profoundly mentally
retarded... enjoyed any special status under the law at that time."''
According to Justice Scalia, this was attributed to a "'deficiency in will'
rendering them unable to tell right from wrong."'' 52 However, "[m]entally
retarded offenders with less severe impairments-those who were not
'idiots'-suffered criminal prosecution and punishment, including capital
punishment." 153 Accordingly, Atkins's constitutional protection could not
fall under the first category of cruel and unusual punishments because his
punishment would not have been considered cruel and unusual at the time
the Bill of Rights was drafted. 
5 4
According to Justice Scalia, however, the majority's resort to the
evolving standards of decency category posed a great problem for the
Justices. 155 "Before [this decision], our opinions consistently emphasized
that Eighth Amendment judgments regarding the existence of social
'standards' 'should be informed by objective factors to the maximum
possible extent' and. . . 'not be ... the subjective views of individual
Justices."'' 56 The most objective of these factors is the legislation passed by
society's elected representatives.'57 Justice Scalia lamented that the majority
paid only "lip service" to this notion and instead "miraculously extract[ed] a
'national consensus' forbidding execution of the mentally retarded."'' 58
149. Id. (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 863-64 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
This is precisely the issue: do mentally retarded persons automatically lack moral blameworthiness
solely because they are defined as mentally retarded (the majority's position) or are mentally
retarded persons, to some degree, able to appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct and be held
accountable for their actions? The Court in Atkins acknowledged that mentally retarded persons may
have the ability to distinguish between right and wrong, yet still held that, because of their disability,
they necessarily lack the moral blameworthiness required to justify capital punishment. Id. at 318.
150. Id. at 340 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331-32 (1989)).
151. Id. Justice Scalia was referring to the year 1791, when the Bill of Rights was drafted. See id.
Instead of being subjected to criminal punishment, these "idiots" were committed civilly or made
wards of the state, either route having the effect of keeping them from harming another again. Id.
152. Id. (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24 (1769)).
153. Id. at 340-41.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 341.
156. Id. (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592, 597 (1977)).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 342.
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Justice Scalia had particular trouble with the fact that only eighteen of the
thirty-eight states (47%) that employ the death penalty have forbidden this
type of execution. 59 Justice Scalia argued that this is "not a statement of
absolute moral repugnance, but one of current preference between two
tolerable approaches," and it is not indicative of a "national consensus.' 6 °
Justice Scalia urged that prior case law mandates more agreement





Furthermore, Justice Scalia criticized the majority for not considering the
infancy of these statutes, the eldest statute being only fourteen years old, not
nearly enough time for the states to have evaluated their practicality. 61
According to the dissent, it was "'myopic to base sweeping constitutional
principles upon the narrow experience of [a few] years."" 163  Justice Scalia
further dismissed the majority's attempt to "bolster its embarrassingly feeble
evidence of 'consensus"' by arguing that the number of states that have
actually enacted legislation prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded
persons has less authoritative weight than the "consistency of the direction
of change."'t 64 Instead, Justice Scalia scathingly rewrote the "'consistency-
of-the-direction-of-change' argument posed by the Court as "[n]o state has
yet undone its exemption of the mentally retarded, one for as long as 14
159. Id. Of the states that have enacted such legislation, only seven of those eighteen jurisdictions
found the death penalty to be so "morally repugnant" that the legislation was applied retroactively to
persons with mental retardation who were already on death row. Id. Important for Justice Scalia
was that the other eleven states specifically limited the prohibition to mentally retarded defendants
convicted after the effective date of the statute. Id. It is possible that these states feared that all
death row inmates would suddenly claim to be mentally retarded if they instituted a retroactivity
clause. However, Justice Scalia drives the point home: if executing the mentally retarded is so
"morally repugnant," then is it not worth risking false claims to ensure that no one is wrongfully
executed? See id.
160. Id. Two of the states with such prohibitions permit execution of the mentally retarded in
limited circumstances. Id. The Kansas statute permits execution of all but the most severely
mentally retarded. Id; see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623(e) (2001). The New York statute allows
execution of mentally retarded offenders if they commit murder while in prison. N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 400.27.12(d) (McKinney 2001); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 2002).
161. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 343; see, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 389, 408 (1986) (exempting
the insane from execution because not a single state authorized that punishment); Enmund v. Florida,
458 U.S. 782, 789 (1982) (noting that 78% of death penalty jurisdictions disallow capital
punishment where the offender was a participant in the underlying crime but did not commit the
murder); Coker, 433 U.S. at 595-96 (stating that only one jurisdiction proscribed the death penalty as
punishment for rape of a woman). In fact, the Court specifically refused to find the execution of
juveniles to be cruel and unusual punishment even though twenty-seven of the thirty-eight death
penalty states had enacted legislation prohibiting the execution of children sixteen and younger. See
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-71 (1989) (plurality opinion). This was an outstanding
71%, yet the Court still refused to find that there was a "national consensus." See id. at 373.
162. Atkins, 536 U.S at 344. Of these eighteen statutes, five were created within the past year. Id.
The speed with which these statutes are being enacted, however, does suggest the immediacy of the
concern, particularly in light of the fact that life is at stake. See id.
163. Id. (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 614).
164. Id. at 344.
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whole years."1 65  Justice Scalia charged the majority with "thrashing about
for evidence of 'consensus,"' and poked fun at its use of the states'
infrequent execution of mentally retarded persons as evidence and its
consideration of the views of professional and religious organizations. 166
Justice Scalia accused the majority of "empty talk of a 'national
consensus,"' and asserted that, in reality, "it is the feelings and intuition of a
majority of the Justices that count. .. 'a majority of the small and
unrepresentative segment of our society that sits on [the] Court." 167
According to his dissent, the majority rested its decision on the false
assumption that judges and juries are unable to "take proper account of
mental retardation," which undermines a crucial understanding in our
society that they actually "play an indispensable role in such matters.,
168
Furthermore, Justice Scalia criticized the Court for ignoring a third and
important societal interest in the death penalty, the "'incapacitation of
dangerous criminals and the consequent prevention of crimes that they may
otherwise commit in the future."" 169 He dismissed the majority's argument
that retribution is not served by executing mentally retarded offenders
because they "are no more culpable than the average murderer."' 170 He urged
that culpability and "deservedness of the most severe retribution[] depends
not merely... upon the mental capacity of the criminal... but also upon the
depravity of the crime," which has traditionally been decided by the
sentencing body weighing the circumstances (mental capacity versus
heinousness of the crime) to reach the appropriate outcome, and not by a
"categorical rule ... impose[d] upon all trials." 171 Justice Scalia reasoned
that "[tihe fact that juries continue to sentence mentally retarded offenders to
death for extreme crimes shows that society's moral outrage sometimes
demands execution of retarded offenders."'
' 72
165. Id. at 345.
166. Id. at 346-48. Justice Scalia attributed the infrequency with which mentally retarded persons
are actually executed to the fact that mental retardation is a "constitutionally mandated mitigating
factor." Id. at 347. Furthermore, he dismissed the professional organizations, the world community,
and the opinion polls as irrelevant. Id. at 347-48.
167. Id. at 348-49 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 873 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
168. Id. at 349.
169. Id. at 350 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 n.28 (1976)). Justice Scalia
criticized the failure to recognize this third societal purpose, yet he also ignored it except to point out
the majority's oversight. See id.
170. Id. Justice Scalia appeared troubled by a lack of evidence showing that the mentally retarded
are naturally more disposed to murder than others and by the evidence that, in fact, quite the
opposite is true: their childlike qualities actually suggest "innocence rather than brutality." Id.
171. Id. at 350-51.
172. Id. at 351. Justice Scalia's assertions are bolstered by John Paul Penry's account of the brutal
rape and murder of Pamela Mosely Carpenter on October 25, 1979, discussed supra note 27 and
accompanying text. Penry described the events of that day as follows:
I went over to her house and circled around the block to see if her husband was there. I
saw a pickup, so I went to the kitchen door to see if he was there. She came to the door.
I asked her if her husband was there and she said "no." That's when I jerked the screen
door open. pulled my knife out and grabbed her. She was screaming and hollering for
help and knocked the knife out of my hand ....
896
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Regarding the deterrence argument, Justice Scalia contended that the
majority never stated that all persons with mental retardation cannot process
the nature of the penalty; rather the majority assumed that mentally retarded
persons are less likely to.be able to process this information. 173 The dissent
argued instead that "the deterrent effect of a penalty is adequately vindicated
if it successfully deters many, but not all, of the target class."' 174 Thus, for
Justice Scalia, the fact that the death penalty for some mentally retarded
offenders may not serve societal purposes is acceptable because, for other
offenders, it will serve both the deterrent and retributive purposes of
criminal sanctions. 175 Therefore, it should be the role of the sentencing body
to determine whether these goals will be adequately met, and not the
categorical decision of the Supreme Court.
176
Finally, the fact that mentally retarded persons might suffer "wrongful
execution" was of no weight to the dissent because similar risks-ineffective
assistance of counsel, lessened ability to show mitigating circumstances, and
making poor witnesses-could arise for "just plain stupid people,
inarticulate people, even ugly people.'
177
V. CRITIQUE
A. What Constitutes a "National Consensus"?
The result in Atkins seems to be the reasonable and moral choice for a
compassionate society, one "which is naturally drawn to protect the less
fortunate, especially those plagued by physical or mental deficiencies."'' 78
But does "the high [C]ourt's decision overstep[] some important legal
boundaries, and ultimately undermine[] our basic democratic
traditions[?]" '179 Some argue that creating a blanket prohibition against
capital punishment of mentally retarded offenders offends the rules, which
the Court created through case law, by limiting the application of the Eighth
Mona Charen, The Retarded, Too, Must Pay for Their Crimes, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE
DISADVANTAGED 114 (Gary E. McCuen ed., 1997). This account reflects the deliberateness of
Penry's actions. See id.Penry appears to have thought out his actions well before acting; for
example, he checked to see if the victim's husband was there before entering the home. Id. Thus,
these actions do not appear to be impulsive activities that were beyond his control. See id.
173. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 351.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 351-52.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 352.
178. Matthew Woessner, Court Ruling Missed Point on Execution, THE HARRISBURG PATRIOT,
July 1, 2002, at AT.
179. Id.
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Amendment's "cruel and unusual" provision."8 Namely, some argue that
the Court must look for a "national consensus" before unilaterally declaring
a punishment to be cruel and unusual and therefore unconstitutional.181
There is widespread criticism, consistent with the dissenting opinions of
Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist, that the national consensus
reached by the majority falls short of the typical notion that a consensus
requires "a broad, stable base of public support." 18 2  However, others
concede that a "national consensus" is emerging because of the number of
legislatures that have enacted such legislation.
183
The dissent accurately points out flaws in the majority's conclusion that
there is a national consensus. 184 Considering the Court's jurisprudence in
this area, the Court has never found a "national consensus" to exist when
there was less than 78% agreement among legislatures. 185  Furthermore, as
Justice Scalia points out, taken together "the population of the death penalty
[s]tates that exclude the mentally retarded is only 44% of the population of
all death penalty [s]tates."' 18 6 For the dissent and other legal professionals,
"[a] national consensus has to be broad, clear and enduring," and the new
state statutes, which the majority uses to strengthen its opinion, amount to
only "a blip on the radar screen of public opinion."'' 87 However, the dissent
did not consider the enormous decisions that the Court made in abortion
cases like Roe v. Wade about issues that were highly controversial, where no
firm national opinion had emerged, and where the Court even had to
establish a right to achieve the desired outcome.
188
Moreover, although only eighteen of the thirty-eight states with the
death penalty have enacted legislation prohibiting the execution of mentally
retarded persons, another twelve have completely rejected the death penalty
as a possible sentence for violent crimes. 8 9 Justice Ginsburg called this a
"super majority" during oral arguments for the Atkins petition, and Justice
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See id. Thus, the blanket rule constitutes an abuse of judicial discretion and a "usurpation of
the state legislatures' lawmaking authority." Id.
183. Executing the Mentally Retarded, AMERICA, Apr. 29, 2002, at 3.
184. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 342 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
185. See, e.g., supra note 161 and accompanying text. These examples show a much higher
threshold for attaining a national consensus than in Atkins.
186. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 346 (citing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 21 (121st ed. 2001)).
187. Linda Greenhouse, Top Court Hears Argument on Execution of Retarded, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
21, 2002, at A21 (quoting Pamela A. Rumpz).
188. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (extending the right to privacy and creating a
sliding scale standard for determining when the state's interest in protecting the potential for human
life outweighs the woman's right to privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(establishing a right to privacy located in the penumbras of the 1st, 4th, 5th, 9th, and 14th
amendments); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (finding a fundamental right to marry). Neither
of these two areas were "settled law," and they might be considered examples of the Court basing its
decision on the Justices' own opinions regarding morality, as Justice Scalia asserted that the majority
did in Atkins. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 348.
189. Greenhouse, supra note 187, at A21.
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O'Connor could not "imagine that [a person] wouldn't count those states" in
establishing a national consensus. 90 Justice Scalia, however, responds that
while "[tihere is something to be said for popular abolition of the death
penalty[,] there is nothing to be said for its incremental abolition by this
Court."' 9 1 By inference, counting these states could result in precedent that
could be used to sustain future categorical rejections of the death penalty.' 92
However, some scholars argue that the narrowing death penalty
jurisprudence is because
[the] primary concern... today-whether by the press, governors,
legislators, or judges-is not squeamishness about the state taking
the lives of criminals .... Instead, the focus today is on the risk-
and over time, the certainty-that a nation that imposes the death
penalty will eventually take the life of an innocent person, assuming
it hasn't already.
93
This is largely because of the revolution of DNA forensic testing that
began in the late 1980s, which can "implicate a guilty person with near
mathematical certainty" and also can "exonerate the innocent with equal
authoritativeness.' 94  Since Furman v. Georgia, more than one hundred
"offenders" have been released from death row because of strong evidence
of their innocence. 195  For many, this may be further compounded by
mentally retarded persons' tendency to unwittingly confess to crimes that
they did not commilt.
19 6
Regardless of the Justices' personal views on executing mentally
retarded persons, and regardless of whether there are moral or procedural
190. Id.
191. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 353. Justice Scalia provided a laundry list of procedural and substantive
impositions that have been placed on the death penalty by the Supreme Court, which have had the
effect of slowly narrowing the circumstances in which the death penalty can be imposed on a
criminal offender. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (prohibiting the
death penalty for offenders under the age of sixteen at the time of the crime); Enmund v. Florida,
458 U.S. 762, 801 (1982) (prohibiting the death penalty for felony murder charges absent a showing
the defendant possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600
(1977) (holding that rape charges cannot carry a sentence of the death penalty); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (prohibiting the death penalty as mandatory punishment for any
crime). The list could go on and on. But even if the Supreme Court is slowly preventing the death
penalty as a sentence, is that necessarily so bad? The risk of executing an innocent person weighs so
heavily on the public conscience that perhaps it would be better to not execute anyone rather than
risk executing even one innocent person.
192. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 353. For example, persons under the age of 18 could be the next
group to be excluded by the Court.
193. Roger Parloff, The New Abolitionism, AM. LAW., Aug. 30, 2002, at 130.
194. Id.
195. Id. In fact, "at least 12 had made their way to death row before science granted them their
eleventh-hour reprieves." Id. In many of the cases, the state officials actually admitted error. Id.
196. ld; see also supra note 120, discussing the case of Earl Washington.
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justifications for their views, the fact remains that the Justices, political
officials, and American people are "continually conflicted: [o]ne instinct is
to guide and protect [mentally retarded persons] from the world, but our
fears lead us to try to protect the world from them. We coddle them, and
sometimes we kill them."' 197 This dilemma plagued state legislatures around
the country prior to the Atkins decision. 198 Despite Justice Scalia's concern
with the majority's reliance on the statutes, because of their infancy, in
determining a "national consensus," the fact remains that, in the thirteen
years that have passed since Penry v. Lynaugh, eighteen state legislatures
and the federal government have felt the issue was important enough to
move through their legislative systems.' 99 Moreover, three additional states
had bills prohibiting such executions awaiting legislative approval at the
time Atkins was handed down. 20  This is particularly powerful when
considered in the context of American society's preference for stricter anti-
crime legislation and sentencing rules.2 °' Coupled with the positions of
numerous religious and professional organizations and public opinion polls,
there does appear to be an emerging view that the practice of executing
mentally retarded offenders is morally and legally wrong.20 2 Is this enough
to justify banning capital punishment in the case of mentally retarded
offenders? Yes, according to the current United States Supreme Court.20 3
Despite the emerging opinion in favor of banning the execution of
mentally retarded offenders, the Justices did not agree about the use of the
views of these organizations, international public policy, and public opinion
polls in determining whether there is a "national consensus.,, 204  Justice
Scalia thought that these references won a prize as "the Court's Most Feeble
Effort to fabricate 'national consensus.' 20 5  Chief Justice Rehnquist
objected to these references because, in his view, they were "antithetical to
considerations of federalism, which instruct that any 'permanent prohibition
upon all units of democratic government must [be apparent] in the operative
197. Evan P. Schultz, Mice, Men and Us: Surveys Say to Stop Killing the Mentally Retarded.
What Will They Say Next?, 169 N. J. L. J. 380 (2002).
198. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
199. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 342-46 (2002).
200. Douglas Mossman, Psychiatry in the Courtroom, PUB. INT., Jan. 1, 2003, at 22. Ironically,
the State Senate of Virginia had already passed a bill banning the death penalty in cases of mentally
retarded offenders, but it was delayed in passing the state house because the legislature was awaiting
the outcome of Atkins. Greenhouse, supra note 187, at A21. In Texas, the bill banning executing
mentally retarded offenders had already been passed through both houses, but it was struck down by
Texas Governor Rick Perry who urged that, in Texas, no one with mental retardation had been
executed. Executing the Mentally Retarded, supra note 183, at 3. The senate sponsor of the Texas
bill, Rodney Ellis, disagrees, claiming that six mentally retarded offenders have been executed since
1982 when Texas resumed capital punishment. Id.
201. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315-16 (arguing that this trend, combined with a complete absence of
legislatures repealing the prohibition, is indicative of a movement by the legislatures in favor of
banning such executions).
202. Id. at 315 n.21.
203. Id. at 321.
204. See id. at 346-47.
205. Id. at 347.
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acts... that the people have approved.' 20 6  In reality, the majority only
dedicated one footnote to the views of these various organizations and the
results of these opinion polls. 207 The footnoted material may have been
interesting to the majority, particularly because of the divergent groups that
expressed their shared opinion that the death penalty should not be imposed
on mentally retarded persons, but this does not mean the majority found this
information to be authoritative.2 °8 The great weight of the authority was
vested in the numerous states that have adopted anti-capital punishment
legislation in this context. 2°9 Thus, the dissents' criticism of the use of these
subjective sources by the majority appears to be unfounded. 210  The fact
remains that, before the Atkins decision, the United States "'[was] the only
established democracy in the world that [was] known regularly to execute
people with mental retardation.' 21 1 While the Chief Justice, Justice Scalia,
and others discount the importance of world opinion,2 2 former United States
diplomats and the European Union have asserted that U.S. policy on capital
punishment has created a "foreign policy problem.
213
Even if the "national consensus" discussed by the majority is enough to
constitute a societal movement against executing the mentally retarded,
many have questioned whether society benefits by moving with social
trends. 214  "Constitutional values, most people would agree, should have
more durability than the latest push poll. '2I" However, society would not
benefit from rigid application of the Constitution as it applied in 1788.216
206. Id. at 322 (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 377 (1989) (plurality opinion)). In
other words, legislation is the chief indicator of changing attitudes toward a particular act, and
therefore it is required before the Court can permanently prevent that act from occurring again. See
id.
207. See id. at 316 n.21. The organizations appear to be mentioned to demonstrate the varying
types of groups that oppose this practice. See id. For example, representatives from various
religious communities "reflecting Christian, Jewish, Muslim, and Buddhist traditions... explain[ed]
that even though their views about the death penalty differ, they all 'share a conviction that the
execution of persons with mental retardation cannot be morally justified."' Id.
208. See id.
209. See id. at 313-17.
210. Seeid. at316n.21.
211. Greenhouse, supra note 187, at A21 (quoting the amicus brief of the European Union)
(emphasis added).
212. See id.
213. Id. However, the United States Constitution derives its meaning from American ideals and
beliefs, not the opinions of other countries regarding our domestic practices. See Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989) (plurality opinion) (stating that "[t]he practices of other
nations ... cannot serve to establish ... that the practice is accepted among our people").
214. Schultz, supra note 197.
215. Id.
216. Id. In 1788, slavery was not only legal, it was constitutional; surely few would prefer
applying that law today. See id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
Reaching a balance between the social views of an era and rigid application
of the Constitution is where the difficulty arises.21 7
B. Divesting Mentally Retarded Persons of Culpability: The Anomaly
"Those mentally retarded persons who meet the law's requirements for
criminal responsibility should be tried and punished when they commit
crimes., 218 However, according to the majority, despite mentally retarded
offenders' inability to give meaningful assistance to counsel, to be effective
witnesses, and to persuasively show mitigation to lessen their culpability,
"[tiheir deficiencies do not warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions,
but they do diminish their personal culpability. ' 21 9 The problem is that if the
mentally retarded offender cannot aid his own defense and potentially faces
wrongful execution, will there not also be a possibility that the mentally
retarded offender will be unable to disprove his guilt even when he is
innocent? 220  In his dissent in Atkins, Justice Scalia noted that if the
majority's claim that mentally retarded offenders are less able to present
their cases because of their condition, then this "might support a due process
claim in all criminal prosecutions of the mentally retarded. '22' "[W]hy do
we have any more faith in their ability to defend themselves against felony
charges that could land them in prison for life than against capital crimes
that could strap them to a gurney?
' 222
The answer to this question lies in the majority's belief that mentally
retarded persons know the difference between right and wrong. 223  Thus,
mental retardation impairs culpability but does not entirely exonerate the
offender from guilt for the offense and, as a result, only precludes the
imposition of capital punishment, which has been historically reserved for
only the most culpable of offenders.224 Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine
how offenders like Daryl Renard Atkins, given his violent history, and John
Paul Penry, given the forethought that went into his criminal activity, could
217. See, e.g.. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002). In Drayton, the Court validated
police searches and interrogation of bus passengers without the police informing the passengers of
their right to decline. Id. This was justified as a security measure in the wake of the terrorist attacks
that occurred on September 11, 2001, despite constitutional protections to the contrary. See id.
218. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306 (2002). This is the first line of Justice Stevens's
majority opinion. Id.
219. Id. at 318.
220. See Schultz, supra note 197 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21); see also McGlone, supra
note 118, at Al.
221. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 352 (Scalia, J.. dissenting).
222. Schultz, supra note 197. Schultz argues that it is not only unconstitutional to sentence a
mentally retarded offender to death, it is also unconstitutional that they were "put on trial in the first
place." Id. The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code states that "[a] person is not
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect
he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of [the] law." Id.; MODEL PENAL CODE § 401 (1) (American Law Inst. 1962).
223. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318 (stating that "[m]entally retarded persons frequently know the
difference between right and wrong and are competent to stand trial").
224. Id.
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be presumed to have diminished culpability as a result of their mental
retardation.225 Justice Scalia argued that culpability "and deservedness of
the most severe retribution, depend[] not merely (if at all) upon the mental
capacity of the criminal (above the level where he is able to distinguish right
from wrong) but also upon the depravity of the crime., 226  Furthermore,
"[t]he fact that juries continue to sentence mentally retarded offenders to
death for extreme crimes shows that society's moral outrage sometimes
demands execution of retarded offenders."
227
However, mental retardation by definition "entails serious limitations on
the ability to appreciate the consequences and gravity of one's actions and to
exercise mature control over one's conduct., 228 Professor James W. Ellis
229
argues that mentally retarded offenders should still be punished for their
crimes but not with the death penalty, because although "[r]etarded people
may know right from wrong and be able to form the intent to commit a
criminal act ... [they] may lack the ability to understand the legal system
and participate fully in their own defense[s]. For that reason, the retarded
face a higher risk than others of wrongful convictions. '230  Moreover, in
Ford v. Wainwright,23 1 the Court recognized the reduced "retributive value
of executing a person who has no comprehension of why he has been singled
out and stripped of his fundamental right to life. '232 Accordingly, there are
excellent arguments on both sides, and the final result depends largely on
225. For a synopsis of John Paul Penry's crime, see Charen, supra note 172, at 114. Daryl Atkins,
by age eighteen, had robbed and then murdered Eric Nesbitt by shooting him eight times, had
participated in two armed robberies, hitting a victim on the head with a bottle after one of the
robberies, and "[t]wo weeks before the murder, Atkins attacked a woman and shot her in the
stomach." Mossman, supra note 200. But also consider the case of Limmie Arthur, who truly
believed he was sentenced to death because he could not read. Rodney Ellis & Joseph Fiorenza,
Criminal to Be Executing Mentally Retarded Inmates, HOUSTON CHRON., May 3, 1999, reprinted in
THE DEATH PENALTY: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 184 (Mary E. Williams ed., 2002). "He diligently
tried to learn [to read] so he could earn his general equivalency diploma because he thought he
would get a reprieve if he was successful." Id. Regardless of Limmie Arthur's crime, it is hard not
to feel sympathy for his misunderstanding of the nature of the punishment in front of him.
226. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 350 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asking "what scientific analysis can possibly
show that a mildly retarded individual who commits an exquisite torture-killing is 'no more
culpable' than the 'average' murderer in a holdup-gone-wrong or a domestic dispute?").
227. Id. at 351.
228. EHRENREICH & FELLNER, supra note 2, at V.
229. Mr. Ellis is the former president of the AAMR and a professor of law at the University of
New Mexico School of Law. Greenhouse, supra note 187, at A21.
230. Id. Another author further argues that "the bottom line is mental retardation doesn't go to
intent, but rather stands as an intellectual lack of capacity .... 'Do you hold a sixth-grader to the
level you hold an adult for the crime? Society doesn't think so."' Maria Vogel-Short, When Should
Low IQs Void Executions? Test Coming, N.J. LAW., Oct. 14, 2002, at 1.
231. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
232. EHRENREICH & FELLNER, supra note 2, at V (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 299, 409
(1986)). The categorical exclusion of the insane from capital punishment serves as precedent for
categorically excluding the mentally retarded. Id.; see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815
(1988) (categorically excluding juveniles under the age of sixteen from capital punishment).
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society's, and the.Justices', opinions of the death penalty in general.233 The
trend has been to narrow the circumstances in which the death penalty is
appropriate, and the Court in Atkins followed that trend.
2 3 4
C. Categorical Exclusion of the Mentally Retarded
Justice Scalia disagreed with the Court's statement "that no one who is
even slightly mentally retarded can have sufficient moral responsibility to be
subjected to capital punishment for any crime. 235  Ironically, despite its
fervent support for the Atkins decision, the American Psychiatric
Association (APA) and others have continually opposed the categorization
of mentally retarded persons and persons with other disabilities and mental
disorders for legal and social purposes.236 This is largely "to reduce the
stigma associated with having a mental [disability or] disorder.,
237
Furthermore, the APA "has vigorously endorsed the Americans [w]ith
Disabilities Act (ADA), which provides broad protection against
discrimination based on mental or physical disabilities. 238 The APA also
said, in its 1997 position statement, that
[c]ategorical distinctions based on mental disorder are tantamount
to class discrimination because they assume that everyone who has
received a particular diagnosis or treatment is identical. In fact,
individuals with the same diagnosis ... may manifest different
kinds of symptoms; even when the symptoms are the same, they
may vary widely in their severity. Nor is there a direct or simple
connection between symptoms['] severity and impairments that may
be relevant to a particular decision.239
Making categorical determinations about mentally retarded persons, such as
denying employment, accommodations, or public services because of the
ignorant belief that they are less responsible, is now illegal because of the
Americans with Disabilities Act.24 ° But this is exactly what was done in the
Atkins case.24' The majority effectively determined that "persons diagnosed
with mental retardation necessarily lack the capacity to accept full moral
233. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 348 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
234. See id. at 314-15. It has been argued that the decision in Atkins is akin to the decision not to
sentence children to death for murder. Jim Marcus, The Next Task: Who is Mentally Retarded? 47
TEX. LAW. (2002). He argues that the disparity in treatment between children and the mentally
retarded is "not based on an otherwise arbitrary criterion of chronological age [or IQ score]; it is
premised on the recognition that punishing someone as if they were possessed of average adult
intelligence, when they are not, is excessive and cruel." Id.
235. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 339.
236. Mossman, supra note 200.
237. Id.
238. Id. In its 1997 position statement, the APA actually admonished against "the use of
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responsibility for their actions., 242  An approach more consistent with the
Americans with Disabilities Act requires that determinations of moral
culpability be made on a case-by-case basis. 43
VI. IMPACT AND SIGNIFICANCE
A. Failure to Set Forth a Standard
The biggest issue confronting state courts after Atkins will be whether
defendants are in fact mentally retarded.2" Some mentally retarded
defendants appear to be normal, but inside their head there is a completely
different picture.245 In Oklahoma, LaQuarius D. Hainta was convicted of
murdering a local ballerina and her friend. 246 The jury and assistant district
attorney rejected his claim of mental retardation, the attorney asserting, "[hie
isn't mentally retarded. He is faking it."'247 Despite Justice Scalia's belief
that the Atkins ruling will turn capital punishment cases into a game "with
killers faking retardation," most find this unlikely, particularly because the
"faking would have to start in elementary school. 248 In order to circumvent
"faking," Georgia requires evidence of mental retardation in the form of
school records and test scores, not IQ alone.249  Most importantly,
"'Georgia's ban [on execution of the mentally retarded] hasn't caused the
faking of retardation.' 25
242. Id.
243. Id. This is what was suggested in the Penry case. But does the fact that, in the thirteen years
since Penry was decided, sixteen states have felt this case-by-case basis was inadequate for
appropriately sentencing the mentally retarded change the landscape?
244. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 339 (2002) (stating "we leave to the State[s] the task of
developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of
sentences") (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 339, 405 (1986)).
245. Diana Baldwin, Jury Finds Man Guilty in Slayings, THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Oct. 2, 2002,
at IA.
246. Id.
247. Id. Can you fake mental retardation? No mention was made in the article of whether a
clinician had evaluated Mr. Hainta prior to trial. Importantly, Oklahoma does not yet have a statute
prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded offenders, and therefore that state may not yet have
adequate standards for handling this defense. See id.
248. Emily Heller, Faking Retardation to Escape Death Penalty Isn't Likely, MIAMI DAILY Bus.
REV., July 5, 2002, at 8. Stephen B. Bright, director of the Southern Center for Human Rights in
Atlanta, Georgia, which was the first state to enact legislation banning the execution of mentally
retarded persons, urges that "[o]f all the things you could feign, mental retardation is just not one of
them." Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. (quoting B. Michael Mears, head of the state's multi-county public defender's office).
Mears says that if there is strong evidence of mental retardation, prosecutors will accept and arrange
for plea bargains; when they do not accept a defendant's mental retardation claim, the issue becomes
a "question for the jury during the guilt-innocence phase of the trial." id.; see also Marcus, supra
note 234.
Interestingly, the APA argued in its amicus brief that "making
psychiatric diagnosis the basis for a life-or-death legal decision would cause
no scientific or practical problems. Both 'incorrect diagnoses' and
'unnecessary legal wrangling' could be avoided because mental retardation
can be identified using time-tested instruments and protocols with proven
validity and reliability., 2 5 1 However, this does not necessarily appear to be
the case.252 Mental health professionals contend that three criteria must be
met to diagnose a person with mental retardation: "significant limitations in
intellectual functioning, significant limitations in practical or adaptive
functioning, and onset before adulthood. ' 253  Although mental health
professionals urge that the examinations used to measure intelligence and
adaptive functioning result in objective determinations, such that
professionals "undertaking separate assessments should reach the same
conclusion, 254 even under the best testing conditions IQ test results usually
err by about five points.255 Moreover, clinicians may have difficulty
objectively interpreting the offender's responses when they know that life
and limb rests on their shoulders.256
Although the Court in Atkins suggested that "by definition" mentally
retarded persons are distinct from non-retarded persons, the truth is that
"mental retardation is an artificial category imposed on a spectrum of human
capability. '257 The diagnostic scale that separates the retarded and the non-
retarded is continually changing; the AAMR has "updated" its definition of
mental retardation ten times over the past century.258 In actuality, "[i]f
persons with mental retardation were members of a homogenous, discrete
biological or psychological category of persons, readily distinguishable from
persons without mental retardation, professional organizations might have an
easier time settling on clinical criteria for diagnosing the condition.
259
The problem is that retarded offenders' impairments vary greatly,
largely due to the variations in biology and environment that can cause the
substantial mental impairment that renders a person "mentally retarded.,
260
While some mentally retarded persons (only 15%) are easily identifiable
251. Mossman, supra note 200 (quoting the APA amicus brief). Mental health professionals have
praised the Court's decision in Atkins for the most part. Id.
252. See id.
253. Id.
254. Id. However, consider the case of Earnest Paul McCarver, who received an IQ score of 74
the first time he was tested and a score of 67 the second time he was tested, which averaged out to a
70.5. Swofford, supra note 66, at B 1. Other professionals find this assertion "remarkable."
Mossman, supra note 200.
255. Mossman, supra note 200. An individual who scores 68 on the first IQ test "has a 95%
chance of scoring between 63 and 73 on subsequent administrations [of the exam]." Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. See generally EHRENREICH & FELLNER, supra note 2, at II (explaining the three criteria
for determining mental retardation).
258. Mossman, supra note 200.
259. Id.
260. Id. Medical conditions that can cause intellectual impairment range from chromosomal
defects to infections that alter the developing brain either before or after birth. Id. Sometimes there
is no specific medical reason for a person's mental retardation. Id.
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because of their limited communication skills or their extremely poor
academic performance through grade school, the remaining persons are
often able to develop the skills necessary to support themselves, only
needing guidance when they have to make complicated decisions.2 6' This
compounds the problem of determining who is mentally retarded for
purposes of excluding from the death penalty because some persons will
have limited cognitive capabilities yet be able to carry on daily living
functions like a non-retarded person.262 Consequently, the use of numerical
scores from IQ tests actually "belie[s] the inherent subjectivity and
complexity of the problem.
263
Furthermore, if IQ scores are used, what clinical level of impaired
functioning, in terms of IQ score, will the states utilize as their cutoff for
mental retardation?264 Will the states without such legislation use an "I.Q. of
70 [as a] bright line test" or will they create a more flexible standard to
account for those offenders who have IQs slightly above 70 but who still do
not have the moral blameworthiness of the average offender?265 What will
the result be when the offender has scored inconsistently, averaging a score
of 70.5?266 This is particularly troublesome given that someone who "scores
69 on an IQ test is practically indistinguishable from someone who scores
71, and that two persons with IQ scores of 67 and 73 have much more in
common with each other than with a person who scores 88. ' '267 It truly is
"this gray area of how to assess mental retardation that.., could be the
biggest issue" facing legislatures today.268 As the attorney representing
Earnest McCarver put it, "[ulsing an inflexible number [like 70] ... might
be OK to decide whether to promote someone to the 10th grade. . . [blut it's
not something [on which] to base a decision. .. whether or not to execute




264. Vogel-Short, supra note 230, at 1.
265. Id.
266. Swofford, supra note 66, at BI. Interestingly, this story involves the case of Earnest
McCarver, the capital defendant whose case the Supreme Court was going to consider until North
Carolina enacted legislation prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded offenders. See REIN.
supra note 65, at 42. His execution became a moot point until it was revealed that his IQ scores
were a 74 before trial and a 67 after conviction, resulting in an average of 70.5. Swofford, supra
note 66, at B I. Because North Carolina adopted an IQ score of 70 as a bright line test for mental
retardation, the statute does not protect McCarver. Id. Unfortunately, he is only one-half of a point
away from being spared from death. Id. His attorneys are currently attacking the constitutionality of
the statute for its lack of flexibility and seeking to enjoin McCarver's death sentence. Id.
267. Mossman, supra note 200 (emphasis added).
268. Vogel-Short, supra note 230, at 1.
269. Swofford, supra note 66. at B I (quoting lawyer Stanley Hammer). Hammer emphasizes that
new professional literature and the AAMR say that lQs of 71 to 75 can also indicate mental
retardation. Id.
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of the mentally retarded, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, New York, and the federal government have
adopted flexible standards for determining mental retardation, thereby not
specifically including an IQ score.27°
Finally, Professor Ellis fears the unsuccessful implementation of Atkins
because of inadequate clinical evaluation of each offender's intellectual
functioning. 271  He asserts that implementation will require "compliance
with Supreme Court [precedent] concerning the role of defense counsel and
access to the assistance of clinical experts. 272 In Ake v. Oklahoma,273 the
Court held that an "indigent capital defendant whose mental condition [is] at
issue [is] entitled to the assistance of 'a competent psychiatrist who will
conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation,
and presentation of the defense., 27 4  Professor Ellis argues that, while
implementing the Atkins decision also requires professional clinical
assistance, this assistance does not necessarily have to come in the form of a
psychiatrist. 275  According to Professor Ellis, to adequately implement
Atkins, defense counsel will need to hire a clinician with expertise in mental
retardation who is able to administer and evaluate IQ tests and able to assess
the offender's adaptive behavior and intellectual impairment.
276
B. The Problem of Retroactivity
The majority opinion in Atkins left much for the states to determine in
implementing Atkins's new constitutional prohibition.277 In addition to
problems with determining the constitutional standard for mental retardation,
what consideration, if any, should be given to the mentally retarded
270. See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, STATE STATUTES PROHIBITING THE DEATH
PENALTY FOR PEOPLE WITH MENTAL RETARDATION, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php
?scid=28&did=138 (2004); see also Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 21 U.S.C. § 848(1) (2003); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 13-4021 (2001); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-9-401 (repealed 2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. §
53a-46a (2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137 (West 2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(j) (1997);
IND. CODE §§ 35-36-9-2 to 35-36-9-6 (2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623 (2002); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 565.030 (2003); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney 2003). Two others, Arkansas and
South Dakota, have adopted rebuttable presumptions of mental retardation at a certain IQ level. See
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (2003) (adopting a rebuttable presumption of mental retardation when
the offender has an IQ of 65 or less); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-26.1 (Michie 2003) (stating
that "an IQ exceeding 70 is presumptive evidence that defendant does not have significant
subaverage general intellectual functioning").
271. See JAMES W. ELLIS, MENTAL RETARDATION AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A GUIDE TO STATE
LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 10, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/MREllisLeg.pdf (last visited Feb. 6,
2004).
272. See id.
273. 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (discussing providing clinical assistance for offenders asserting the
insanity defense).
274. ELLIS, supra note 271, at 10-11 (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985)).
275. Id. at 11.
276. Id.
277. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 348 (2003).
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offenders currently on death row?278 What about persons already on death
row who never raised the issue of their mental retardation? 279 Although the
Court did not address retroactivity in Atkins, the Court in Penry indicated
that if mental retardation had been held to violate the Eighth Amendment,
the new rule of law would have applied retroactively.280  Prior to the Atkins
decision, the Tennessee Supreme Court had tackled the retroactivity of its
statutory prohibition against executing mentally retarded persons in Van
Tran v. Tennessee.281  The Tennessee Supreme Court became the second
state supreme court to hold that executing mentally retarded persons is
unconstitutional despite the absence of "clear statutory language providing
for retroactivity" of the state law.282 Thus, there is support for the retroactive
application of the Atkins decision.283  However, between setting a standard
for determining who qualifies as mentally retarded and potentially applying
278. This issue was not considered in Justice Stevens's majority opinion. Lyn Entzeroth,
Constitutional Prohibition on the Execution of the Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendant, 38 TULSA
L. REV. 299, 326 (2002). Only seven of the eighteen states constituting the "national consensus"
actually have legislation prohibiting all executions of mentally retarded persons; the other eleven
provide that their statutes only apply prospectively. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 342 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that if society felt that executing the mentally retarded was so "morally
repugnant," then society would not allow the execution regardless of the conviction in light of the
current prohibition). But see Cynthia Han, "Evolving Standards of Decency": Legislative and
Judicial Developments Leading to Atkins v. Virginia, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 469, 471
(2002) (noting that, in Florida, "the absence of a retroactivity provision was simply a concession
made in order to gain the support of state prosecutors").
279. Professor Carol S. Steiker opines that Atkins may "reinvigorate claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel" against defense attorneys that failed to "investigate or present evidence
relating to the defendant's childhood, educational difficulties, or mental infirmity." Carol S. Steiker,
Things Fall Apart, But the Center Holds: The Supreme Court and the Death Penalty, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1475, 1480 (2002) (citing Brownlee v. Haley, No. 00-15858, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19069
(1 th Cir. Sept. 16, 2002) for the proposition that appellate courts will vacate death sentences when
defense counsel fails to investigate claims of mental retardation).
280. Entzeroth, supra note 278, at 326. In Penry, the Court stated that the decision of Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), means
that a new rule will not be applied retroactively to defendants on collateral review unless
it falls within one of two exceptions .... [T]he first exception set forth in Teague should
be understood to cover not only rules forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary
conduct but also rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of
defendants because of their status or offense. Thus, if we held, as a substantive matter,
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of mentally retarded persons such as
Penry regardless of the procedures followed, such a rule would fall under the first
exception to the general rule of nonretroactivity and would be applicable to defendants on
collateral review.
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 329-30 (1989) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
281. 66 S.W.3d 790, 800 (Tenn. 2001).
282. Han, supra note 278, at 473 (citing State v. Van Tran, 66 S.W.3d 790, 798 (Tenn. 2001)).
283. State courts appear to support the retroactive application of Atkins. See, e.g., Pickens v.
Oklahoma, 74 P.3d 601, 603 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 2003) (holding that the clear intention of the
Court was to apply Atkins to all death row inmates, including offenders currently on death row);
Clemons v. Alabama, No. CR-01-1355, 2003 WL 22047260, at *3 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 29,
2003) (concluding that the Atkins decision "falls within Teague's first exception to the general rule
of nonretroactivity and applies retroactively to cases that are on collateral review").
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the Atkins decision to all death penalty inmates who claim to be mentally
retarded, a floodgate of litigation may have been opened.284
According to Professor Ellis, the best method of implementing the
Atkins decision is for states to adopt the approach of North Carolina. 285 The
North Carolina statute applies to "both prospective cases and those that
might be challenged by individuals already under a death sentence, and
provide[s] separate procedures for the retrospective cases. 286 He advises
state legislatures to utilize the following statutory language: "[n]o person
with mental retardation is eligible for the death penalty. 287 Ellis also warns
that while the states are free to adopt their own variations in defining mental
retardation, "they cannot adopt a definition that encompasses a smaller
group of defendants. 288
C. Significance
Death penalty abolitionists view Atkins as a step in the right direction
towards ending capital punishment altogether.289 These groups argue that
"[i]n 2002, the death penalty continued to come under increasing
scrutiny, ' 290 particularly in light of the Court's decisions in Atkins and Ring
v. Arizona.29 1 It is urged that these two decisions effectively invalidated the
administration of the death penalty in two-thirds of the states that still permit
the death penalty.292 Thus, death penalty abolitionist groups are ecstatic with
the Court's rulings and hope to see further decisions limiting death penalty
sentences.293
However, while the Atkins and Ring decisions may have cut the number
of persons who will actually be put to death, the decisions probably will not
end the death penalty.294 Professor Steiker argues that Atkins and Ring "are
the predictable products of a long-term meliorist approach to capital
punishment, which itself is the product of a consistent struggle between two
284. See Entzeroth, supra note 278, at 326-28. Likewise, Professor Steiker asserts that
[w]hile the effect of Atkins... will be measured in part by the number of inmates who
escape the death penalty or get a second chance at a sentencing hearing, perhaps a larger
part of the impact of the... case[] will be in the uncertainty and massive litigation [it]
will spawn. which will temporarily halt the administration of capital punishment in some
places, and certainly slow it down everywhere.
Steiker, supra note 279, at 1479.
285. ELLIS, supra note 271, at 4.
286. Id.; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005 (2002).
287. See ELLIS, supra note 271, at 4.
288. See id. at 5 (emphasis omitted).
289. See, e.g., DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2002: YEAR
END REPORT, at www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/yrendrpt02.pdf (2002).
290. Id.
291. 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (holding that it is unconstitutional for judges to determine sentences
rather than juries).
292. Steiker, supra note 279, at 1475.
293. See MissY LONGSHORE, SUPREME COURT RULING ON RETARDATION TIP OF ICEBERG ON
DEATH PENALTY WOES, at http://www.deathpenalty.org/facts/other/MR%20stmt.html (June 20,
2002).
294. Steiker, supra note 279, at 1488.
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political poles on the Court."'2 95 She reasons that the decisions actually
"contribute to the stabilization of capital punishment" because "[t]he more
the Supreme Court slows down, muddies up, and nibbles around the edges
of the administration of capital punishment, the harder it becomes to sharpen
the focus of the debate in a way that is necessary for abolition to occur."
296
Thus, the Court, in imposing limitations on the administration of death
sentences, may have reduced abolitionists' concerns and struck a balance
between the deterrence and retribution rationales for the punishment.
297
The decision will also impact future attempts to narrow the death
penalty. 298 "Atkins will likely inspire.., efforts to create categorical death
penalty exemptions for defendants with other serious mental limitations" and
sometimes defendants with not-so-serious limitations. 299 Thus, the floodgate
opened in Atkins may eventually apply to not only mental retardation cases,
but also to Eighth Amendment cases generally. 300 By analogy, there may be
a movement to extend the Atkins decision and its reasoning to juveniles and
the mentally ill. 30' There is even a possibility that one day someone will try
to exclude from capital punishment persons diagnosed with Attention-
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).30 2  Despite the controversy
surrounding that disorder, mental health professionals regard ADHD as a
"real disorder that can severely disrupt functioning in children, and that
often persists into adulthood., 303  ADHD, according to the APA's
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, "interferes 'with developmentally
appropriate social, academic, or occupational functioning' and may lead to
295. Id. at 1489.
296. Id. Professor Steiker argues that despite the high reversal rates of death penalty sentences.
the capital justice system is stabilizing because the longer capital defendants spend on death row, the
more time there is to conduct a thorough review of the evidence and use DNA to exonerate the
innocent. Id. A primary concern for most abolitionists of the death penalty is that an innocent
person will be executed. See id.
297. See id.
298. See generally Mossman, supra note 200.
299. Id. The decision is most likely to spawn arguments against executing juveniles, the mentally
ill, and mentally retarded offenders with an adult onset of symptoms, which are often referred to as
"cognitive disorders" Id. Examples of cognitive disorders include Alzheimer's disease, mental
deterioration following drug abuse, and head injuries. Id. One court has already used Atkins to hold
that capital punishment of juveniles is unconstitutional. See State ex. rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112
S.W.3d 397, 399 (Mo. 2003) (prohibiting the execution of juveniles as unconstitutional because of a
"national consensus" against the practice).
300. Steiker, supra note 279, at 1480. Professor Steiker reasons that the "'evolving standards of
decency' standard is "tantalizingly vague," leaving a lot of room for attempts to extend the
reasoning beyond the actual Atkins holding. Id. (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21
(2002)).
301. Id. Four justices have already indicated that Atkins should be extended to exempt juveniles
from capital punishment. Id.; In re Stanford, 536 U.S. 968 (2002) (Stevens, J., joined by Souter,
Ginsberg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting from the denial of certiorari and "calling for [an] end to [the]
'shameful practice' of executing juveniles").
302. See Mossman, supra note 200.
303. Id.
'engagement in potentially dangerous activities without consideration of
possible consequences.'
30 4
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Atkins decision will impact
the victims' families. 305  The families want the criminal defendants to get
their "just desserts" to vindicate the lives of their loved ones.3 °6 The fact that
the offender was mentally retarded does not change the fact that someone
lost a family member, friend, or lover in a heinous crime.30 7 Regardless of
whether the offender is mentally retarded, mentally ill, or just a terrible
person, it is understandable that these "victims" want closure and seek
revenge. These feelings are not unexpected or incorrect, and only someone
who has lost a loved one can really understand this grief.30 8 Nevertheless,
the law has a duty to protect persons who cannot protect themselves. The
Atkins result is an unsettled desire for revenge by the victim's friends and
family and the American people, and a mentally retarded person who may
have done something morally repugnant but who will not pay the ultimate
price for his horrific crime.
VII. CONCLUSION
As the great Justice Marshall once said, "the question with which we
must deal is not whether a substantial portion of American citizens would
today, if polled, opine that capital punishment is barbarously cruel, but
whether they would find it to be so in the light of all information presently
available., 30 9  The Supreme Court in Atkins felt that, if the American
populace understood the nature of mental retardation, they would also agree
that capital punishment is barbarously cruel in light of the circumstances
surrounding the offender.3t0 Perhaps their decision was based on the
Justices' own moral beliefs regarding the righteousness of executing
someone with mental retardation,3  or perhaps their decision was entirely
based on the supposed "national consensus" evidenced by the state
legislatures. 31 2 Regardless, the decision of the United States Supreme Court
has effectively equalized the United States with other civilized countries in
this respect.3t 3 It insures that even if a mentally retarded person is coerced
into a confession, cannot properly assist counsel in his or her defense, or is
304. Id. (quoting the APA Diagnostic and Statistical Manual). At what point these arguments will
become far-fetched is hard to say. However, so long as offenders legitimately argue that they have
lessened culpability, the Court may continue to consider issues such as whether a person with
ADHD is sufficiently less culpable to be exempt from the death penalty. See id.
305. See John Gibeaut, Death Delayed, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2002 (discussing John Paul Penry's long-
awaited death sentence and the family that prays that he will die despite the Atkins decision).
306. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2003).
307. See, e.g., Gibeaut, supra note 305.
308. See id.
309. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 362 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
310. SeeAtkins, 536 U.S. at 315-17.
311. Id. at 348-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
312. See id. at313-17.
313. See Greenhouse, supra note 187, at A21.
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an ineffective witness, he or she will not die for the inability to fully
understand the scrutiny he or she is under.314
Lisa Odom315
314. Seeid. at313-17.
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